IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION


STEPHEN B. JONES, LINDA D. LYDIA and CAROLINE FRANCO, as Texas registered voters,

CIVIL ACTION NUMBER

VERSUS

3:00-CV-2543-D

GOVERNOR GEORGE W. BUSH AND RICHARD B. CHENEY, as candidates for President and Vice-President of the United States of America; and ERNEST ANGELO, GAYLE WEST, BETTY R. hINES, JAMES B. RANDALL, HELEN QUIRAM, HENRY W. TEICH, JR., WILLIAM EARL JUETT, HALLY B. CLEMENTS, HOWARD PEBLEY, JR., ADAIR MARGO, TOM F. WARD, JR., CARMEN P. CASTILLO, CHUCK JONES, MICHAEL PADDIE, JAMES DAVIDSON WALKER, JOSEPH I. O'NEIL, III, BETSY LAKE, ROBERT J. PEDEN, JIM HAMLIN, MARY E. COWART, SUE DANIEL, JAMES R. BATSELL, LOYCE MCCARTER, MICHAEL DUGAS NEAL J. KATZ, MARY CEVERHA, CLYDE MOODY SIEBMAN, RANDALL TYE THOMAS CRUZ G. HERNANDEZ, JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, STAN STANART and KEN CLARK, Texas Electors



November 27th, 2000

TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONIC SCHEDULING CONFERENCE BEFORE THE HONORABLE SIDNEY A. FITZWATER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff:

WILLIAM K. BERENSON, P.C. 1701 River Run, Suite 900 Fort Worth, Texas, 67107 817-885-8000

JAMES JONES
Jones & Associates
5015 Tracy #100
Dallas, Texas 75205
214/219-3456

PAMELA J. WILSON, C.S.R., U.S. DISTRICT COURT

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1	For the Defendant:	HARRIET E. MIERS and EVAN E. FITZMAURICE
2		Locke Liddell & Sapp, L.L.P. 2200 Ross Avenue, Suite 2200
3		Dallas, Texas 75201-6776 214/740-8000
4		221, 710 0000
5		ROBIN P. HARTMANN and STACY L. BRAININ
6		Haynes & Boone L.L.P. 3100 NationsBank Plaza
7		Dallas, Texas 75202 214/651-5000
8		214/651-5000
9		DAVID AUFHAUSER
10		Williams & Connolly 725 12th Street N.W.
11		Washington, D.C. 20005 202/434-5049
12		
13		ANDY TAYLOR First Assistant Attorney General
14		BRENT BENOIT Special Assistant Attorney General
15		State of Texas 209 W. 14th, 8th floor
16		Austin, Texas 78701 5121/936-1888
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22	Court Reporter:	PAMELA J. WILSON, CSR
23		1100 Commerce, Room 15A3 Dallas, Texas 75242
24		214/415-1884
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1 PROCEEDINGS: 2 THE COURT: This is Judge Fitzwater speaking. Is Mr. Berenson there? 3 MR. BERENSON: 4 THE COURT: Ms. Miers? 5 MS. MIERS: Yes, I'm here, judge. 6 And Mr. McNeil? 7 THE COURT: 8 MR. HARTMANN: Rob Hartmann, Stacy Brainin for Haynes and Boone. 9 10 THE COURT: And Mr. Taylor or Mr. Benoit? 11 MR. TAYLOR: We're both here, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: All right. I have in my presence here the court reporter and my law clerks, and I have you on my 13 14 speakerphone. To assist the court reporter, if you would 15 please state your name before you speak, so that she will 16 have a clear record of who it is who is presenting argument 17 or asking questions. And if you will please, try not to talk over each 18 other. And I will make certain that I give everyone an 19 20 opportunity to speak. And if I inadvertently forget someone 21 on a particular point, you can then ask to be heard, because it's not my intention to overlook anyone. 22 I'm going to assume that we don't lose a connection 23 24 with any attorney, but if something happens, please let me

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know.

The purpose for convening this conference is primarily for scheduling. And I have in mind in talking about scheduling three primary matters. There may be others.

One is the matter of briefing the motions to dismiss that were filed today.

The second is the matter of submitting materials and briefs on the preliminary injunction application.

And the third is what, if any, expedited discovery should be permitted and how should it be conducted.

I have in mind a possible plan that could bring this matter to a decision on Friday, December 1st, which would allow one side or the other to appeal at that point.

But before I give those thoughts, I will be glad to hear first from Mr. Berenson and then I'll hear from opposing counsel.

Mr. Berenson.

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MR. BERENSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

I would like to introduce to the court and all parties Mr. James Jones who I'm going to -- he's going to be filing a notice of appearance as lead counsel, Your Honor. So I would like to actually turn this over to him.

THE COURT: Mr. Jones.

MR. JONES: Your Honor, as Mr. Berenson said, I'll be filing an appearance as lead counsel in this case.

Also filing an appearance in this case will be Mr.

Charles McGarry, who is the former chief justice of the Fifth District Court of Appeals, and Professor Levinson from the University of Texas, constitutional law scholar.

THE COURT: All right. Fine.

MR. JONES: And since I'm coming, you know, late to this party, I've just recently had an opportunity to review everything that has been filed. And in looking at this, my thought was in terms of expedited discovery that the most expeditious way of getting the evidence that we would need to get to be able to present the court with a full record on the briefing, would be the deposition of Mr. Cheney and his wife, which I think we could complete in a single day, going half a day with each.

And, you know, we could do those here in Dallas, we could do those in D.C. That doesn't particularly matter to me.

We would, of course, like to get those done as soon as possible, so that we could get our motion for preliminary injunction filed no later than Monday of next week, the 4th.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Jones, what discovery do you contemplate needing?

MR. JONES: Again, a -- the depositions of Mr. Cheney and his wife, along with a duces tecum.

THE COURT: Let me be more specific. I'm sorry.

MR. JONES: Okay.

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THE COURT: What types of questions do you intend to ask of the witnesses?

MR. JONES: Well, certainly, if -- if you look at all the items contained within the complaint, everything -- just go down that list, everything along those lines about the listing of the residence in Highland Park for sale, where that stands, you know, whether that's a genuine attempt to sell or simple a sham.

The circumstances surrounding the switching of the -- of the voter registration.

And we have some indication there may have been some switch in driver's license and/or auto registrations. And so information regarding that.

Information, you know, regarding, for example, if the registration were switched where those -- where those automobiles were located at. And a whole -- a whole list of -- of issues that would go to the state in which Mr. Cheney is an inhabitant.

THE COURT: The reason I'm asking is the defendants in their response have cited the court to cases -- one Fifth Circuit case in fact that I wrote, in re: FDIC, concerning the discretion of a court to order a high-level public official to appear for a deposition.

It appears to me -- and they suggest -- although they

oppose discovery in light of their motions to dismiss -- they suggest interrogatories.

And my thought would be that I could allow you a certain number of interrogatories. And, again, I have not heard from the defendants yet. But if I were to allow you a certain number of interrogatories and expedite the response date, why those would be an unacceptable substitute?

MR. JONES: Well, in that case, Your Honor, certainly if -- if we're going to be limited to the interrogatories, without the chance to follow-up on those in depositions, we would -- we would want greater than the 25 allowed by the local rules, of course. And I think if combined with request for production, that would give us documentary evidence that we need, then -- again, deposition would be my first choice, but that would be an acceptable second choice.

THE COURT: Before I hear from defense counsel, the reason I am pursuing that, in part, is because it appears that the plaintiffs have evidence already that they believe establishes the basis for their claims. And I'm wondering what it is in fact that you need, in addition to what you already apparently have because of the allegations of your pleadings.

MR. JONES: Well, Your Honor, the allegations in pleadings and admissible evidence are two different things.

And while we had a good faith -- we -- I believe Mr.

Berenson had a good faith belief in the allegations that he put in the complaint, you know, which came from various sources, getting that information in the form of admissible evidence is what discovery is for.

THE COURT: Well, before I hear from the defendants, you sought a temporary restraining order and you must have had evidence that you felt warranted a temporary restraining order.

MR. JONES: Well, I have a hard time answering that one, Your Honor, because I didn't request the temporary restraining order.

THE COURT: That's fine. Fair enough, Mr. Jones.
All right. Ms. Miers.

MS. MIERS: On behalf of Governor Bush -- judge, I am accompanied by Evan Fitzmaurice of our office also, for the record.

We would urge the court to consider the merits of the motions to dismiss, because we believe that those are dispositive of this case and that when ruled upon the need for any discovery whatsoever would not exist.

So with respect to the court's question in terms of schedule, which addressed first the schedule for responding to the motions, we think that that is the appropriate focus and that once the motions are briefed and ruled upon that we

feel strongly that there will be no need for discovery, because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and dismissal is appropriate.

THE COURT: Ms. Miers, what I have in mind -- and this will help other counsel in focusing on what I'm looking at. I'm looking at the potential need to address both the motion to dismiss and the merits in tandem, so that in the event of an appeal the appellate court has everything before it. Thus, even if the court -- assume arguendo the court granted the motion to dismiss but the appellate court reversed, it would not be back here before me on a very short time frame.

What is your position on the possibility of going forward with the merits, understanding that it is the court's intent to give full attention to your motion to dismiss?

MS. MIERS: Your Honor, I believe other counsel will have comment about that issue also, because there are a number of named defendants that are not before the court at the present time. So any kind of hearing on the merits is an issue that will need to be discussed.

THE COURT: Ms. Miers, when I said merits, I did not mean a trial as in a final trial on the merits. I meant merits only in terms of a preliminary injunction.

MS. MIERS: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

I think -- I think with respect to the injunctive matter, we still feel that the motions are dispositive and consideration of the motions are sufficient to dispose of the matter based on the plaintiffs' pleadings.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Mr. Hartmann.

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MR. HARTMANN: Yes, Your Honor. Ron Hartmann for Secretary Cheney.

It is our view, Your Honor, that there is no discovery that would at all advance the issues that are raised in the papers which we put before you. We just don't believe, based upon a reading of the Constitution or a reading -- you know, the standing issues and the political questions issues that we've raised, that there is any discovery at all that is implicated.

I think that we would have a sufficient record before the court based upon these pleadings that we've filed with the court.

David, is there something you would like to add to that?

My name is David Aufhauser. MR. AUFHAUSER: with the firm of Williams and Connolly from Washington, and with the permission of the court will be on behalf of Mr. Cheney.

> THE COURT: That's fine, counsel.

1 I don't believe we have your name on a pleading. Will you mind spelling it for the court reporter? 2 MR. AUFHAUSER: Of course. I've been asked that 3 millions of times. A-U-F-H-A-U-S-E-R, David Aufhauser. 4 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, counsel. 5 You may proceed. 6 MR. AUFHAUSER: Forgive me if I repeat just a few 7 8 points that co-counsel have made. But it's worth stating again. 9 We believe that the scholarship and the pleadings 10 before the court will demonstrate to the court convincingly 11 12 that this is really a nonjusticiable controversy and that it is properly not before the court. If anything, if there is 13 14 a controversy or contest over what constitutes definition of inhabitancy on December 18th, it's a matter that is 15 16 committed quite properly to the houses of Congress and to 17 the electoral college. Having said that, trying to address your specific 18 question about whether you can reach the merits, I guess I 19 20 have two responses initially. 21 One is, a great many of the alleged facts are matters public record already, so I truly don't believe that there 22 is necessity for further discovery. 23

that the -- if you are to look at the question of

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Just as importantly, second, it is our firm conviction

inhabitancy, that the dispositive date for answering that question is the date when the electoral college meets and votes, which is December 18th.

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So if we are correct, and if the court agrees with us, you cannot reach a merits decision whether someone is an inhabitant before the 18th, of Texas or Wyoming, all of which goes to underscore the very thrust of our pleadings filed with the court again. Which, again, this is a nonjusticiable controversy, generalized grievance submitted and championed by the citizens. And it's one which respectively is not committed for resolution to an Article III court but rather, if it's a true controversy, recognized as such, to the contest of the electoral college vote in the house of representatives.

So for those reasons, I -- I truly don't believe further discovery is necessary.

Of course, my fallback position is I think that the court has judicially suggested that if there is to be any discovery it should be the least intrusive kind, which would be a limited number of written interrogatories. But, again, we think -- I think we will be intruding upon the court's time unnecessarily with any such pleadings and any such matters, because I think if you accept the pleadings from Mr. Jones, Mr. Berenson, and perhaps the opportunity for us to file a short reply brief, that the court will be

convinced that we are correct that this controversy is not properly before it.

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.

Mr. Taylor.

MR. TAYLOR: Your Honor, currently I represent 8 of the 32 electors of the electoral college from Texas, and that's a result of the practical consequence of these folks being sued on the eve of the Thanksgiving break. And my office, myself included, over the last four days and continuing on today, has attempted diligently to reach each and every one of the 32 electors, and thus far we've only been successful in reaching 25 percent, or 8 of those folks. And each of them has retained my counsel in this case, and I can speak on their behalf.

But there are 24 others who are yet to have been notified. I can tell you that to the best of my knowledge none of the 32 electors, prior to contacts from this office, knew of the existence of this lawsuit or its filing. And to the best of my knowledge none of the 32, and certainly not the 8 that I made contact with, have been given service of process. So I wanted the record to reflect that.

I would urge the court to consider the motion to dismiss that was filed on behalf of the 8 electors, because we do not believe this is an Article III case or controversy. Not arguing the merits of the motion, I simply

would say succinctly that we believe this is not only a case where there's no standing on the part of these three citizens who filed this lawsuit, but also one in which no justiciable political -- or rather no justiciable controversy exists, because it's a political question.

And so the court I believe under appropriate case law would need to confront whether it has jurisdiction or not on the front end and not alongside any determination of the preliminary injunction.

And, of course, as we see the case and the applicable statutes, constitutional provisions, and case law, we believe that the proper decision would be to grant our motion to dismiss.

In the event that the court does not see fit to grant the motion to dismiss, which it must decide first, then the court obviously will need to wrestle with the other issues in the case. And my only practical comment that I would make, that is contained in our filings of today, is that we don't have 24 of the 32 electors before Your Honor at this point. So I would need time to be able to contact them, confirm that they want representation by the office of Attorney General, and then file the appropriate papers, which we will attempt to do forthwith.

THE COURT: All right. This is Judge Fitzwater again.

Let me now specify what I'm looking at and give counsel a chance to respond.

In talking about reviewing the merits in tandem with the motions to dismiss. I do not suggest that I am allowed to reach the merits despite the motions to dismiss. I recognize that if the motion to dismiss -- or the motions are meritorious, that at least generally, if not specifically, they preclude the court from reaching the merits.

What I am trying to do is get this case in a posture where regardless of my ruling one side or the other is not prejudiced in its appeal.

In particular, the plaintiffs have already requested, and I have denied, a request that this case go ahead and go to the circuit court or to the U.S. Supreme Court. And I am sensitive to what I said in my order the other day, deciding this matter expeditiously. And I do not want a party put in a position where it obtains relief in an appellate court and it comes back to me. So I hope I am being clear to counsel when I say that in discussing dual tracks. I am not under the misimpression that I can reach the merits even if I grant a motion to dismiss.

That said, it seems to me that this case should be resolved in this court as quickly as possible. I had in mind a relatively quick due date for the plaintiffs to

respond to the motions to dismiss, with no right of reply, so that I could go ahead and get that resolved.

I also had in mind some limited form of discovery, that I'll discuss in a moment, with quick deadlines for submitting the materials I talked about under Rule 43(e) in my November 20 order.

It seems to me on the matter of discovery that the plaintiffs had some basis for seeking a temporary restraining order, since a temporary restraining order application requires a verified complaint or supporting evidence that is admissible. It also appears that much of the evidence on which they rely is, as one counsel argued, based on matters of public record. Therefore, it would not appear that the plaintiffs would need discovery to support matters of public record.

In response however, to the plaintiffs' application, at least one set of defendants, I think it's Governor's Bush and Secretary Cheney's in their response, have laid out what they believe to be evidence that Secretary Cheney is not an inhabitant of Texas at this time or would not be by December 18. And it could be that the plaintiffs would be entitled to some limited form of discovery under my dual-track method to address those matters, such as to have him state under oath in an interrogatory response that he did put his house up for sale or that he did obtain a driver's license. I'm

just picking these from the list to be illustrative.

I believe that given the -- the plaintiffs' desire for a quick response -- resolution, and certainly the defendants' desire for a quick resolution of their motion to dismiss, that we could get this done and I could issue a ruling by this Friday, if we all worked on this and got it done.

Now, I have some specific thoughts, but I would like to go back around the horn again and let counsel respond.

Mr. Jones.

MR. JONES: Well, I guess the response I have, the need for discovery and the fact that a temporary restraining order was sought, that discovery isn't needed.

If I recall reading the original complaint correctly, a lot of the allegations in there were made asking the court to take judicial notice. And once again, I'll just reiterate that something being a matter of public record in the newspaper is a jump away from being admissible.

I think it's important that when the court does, you know, reach the decision of whether or not Mr. Cheney is an inhabitant of Texas, at whatever time the court determines to be the relevant inquiry, that it do so on as full a record as possible. Because certainly as this thing moves up to higher courts, you know, we will have to rely on the record that was created in this court. And what I would

hate to see happen is get to the Fifth Circuit or the Supreme Court and then have a ruling at one of those courts that we didn't present sufficient evidence to make a determination because we were denied the opportunity to conduct the discovery that would have given us that information.

Beyond -- beyond that, I certainly have no objection to quick responses to the motion to dismiss and have no objection to submitting the 43(e) materials as quickly as is practical given whatever discovery the court allows us. And I have no objection to considering the motion to dismiss and the merits in tandem.

THE COURT: Ms. Miers.

MS. MIERS: Your Honor, if what the court is suggesting is move forward this week and by Friday have this in shape for the court to rule, on behalf of my client I think that is perfectly acceptable.

If the court were providing two days for plaintiffs to respond, I would request a very brief, maybe 24-hour period, to respond to whatever is filed. I don't relish the thought of telling my client that I don't get to reply at all. So I would -- that would put the matter though -- if I am calculating correctly, if plaintiffs were filing their papers by Wednesday at 5:00, if we could have until Thursday at 5:00, then we'll -- would appreciate that opportunity,

and then the court would be in a position to rule on the motion.

THE COURT: Mr. Hartmann -- or Mr. Aufhauser.

MR. HARTMANN: Mr. Hartmann.

Your Honor, let me just say briefly -- and going back to the question of putting beside the substantial legal issues that are before you before we get here, but focusing on the date of December 18, plaintiffs were asked what discovery they might want. They referred you to the particulars which are in their complaint. That complaints are inhabitant/jurisdictional kind of allegations, but they don't speak as to the only important date that is before you, which is December the 18th. I think we go through this discovery and we probably don't add anything to the record that will be before you in dealing with these weighty issues. I really don't see why anything along those -- along those lines, in terms of interrogatories, is necessary to move this case along.

I think when we look at the focus on the electoral college, we see that on the 18th if there's an objection that it is thrown into the legislative sphere, and the plays into our view that this is not a proper place for the courts to be involved in any event. I think there's a very careful and well *spelled-out scheme for objecting at that point.

David.

MR. AUFHAUSER: Your Honor, this is David Aufhauser again.

I think Mr. Hartmann said just about everything I wanted to say.

I -- I want to underscore Ms. Miers' request that if you put together a briefing schedule that anticipates this form of discovery that we do have the opportunity to reply, because I don't know what they're going to assert the significance of any fact allegedly adduced in discovery is likely to be. So I would ask the court to give us a mere 24 hours within which to respond.

But I do have to go back to what Mr. Hartmann said, which is, that it is our conviction that the correct view is that the question of inhabitancy is a question that focuses on December 18th. And taking discovery about what transpired during the last year, five years, or 50 years of Secretary Cheney's life is an irrelevancy that comes at a time -- I say this with deepest respect to the court. I don't want to overstate the issue, but it comes at a time when his attention is directed to a lot of weighty things, not the least of which is his health.

And I -- I will, of course, do the court's bidding, as will the secretary. But I would hate to go back and intrude upon him on an unnecessary and largely moot exercise if the court reads the scholarship that we have filed and the

papers that opposing counsel filed and make a decision on that order first.

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Of course, if the court decides that you do have the power and you want to go forward, I can represent to the court if you issued such an order on Monday, early next week, we'll -- we'll moved you with the modest discovery you're asking for, because I'll tell the secretary he's compelled to. But I ask you to reconsider the need for discovery.

THE COURT: This is Judge Fitzwater.

Let me first clarify a term I've been using, because I think counsel may be confused and think I'm going to cut them off. When I use the word "reply," I meant a reply brief, a rejoinder of the defendants in support of their motion to dismiss after the plaintiffs responded. Not that they would have no right to respond through their own brief and appendix in opposition to the preliminary injunction brief and appendix of the plaintiffs. Certainly they would have that right. I was simply deleting the reply brief rights that normally exist to remove one more step, and in the hopes that through my own work and having read your briefs I could make a prompt decision.

With regard to the matter of discovery, let me go back to Mr. Jones for a minute, or co-counsel, concerning this dispositive date. I noted that when the plaintiffs filed their amended complaint there is language -- and just, for example, I'm looking at paragraph 12 on page 4 of the emergency amended complaint, where the plaintiffs use the future tense, "will be an inhabitant on December 18."

What is the plaintiffs' position whether the dispositive date is December 18?

MR. JONESS: Well, Your Honor, I think that's a question that the court is going to have to determine in the course of this, is what is the relevant date.

And there are at least three or four dates that could be relevant to this inquiry. The first is when Mr. Cheney was selected as Mr. Bush's running mate. The second would be the date on which he was elected by the convention as the -- as the vice presidential candidate, which -- at which point the Texas electors were bound, subject to him winning the majority in Texas on November 7th, to vote for him. The third would, of course, be the November 7th, the election day. And the fourth possible date and only one of four possible dates, would be December 18th.

Our -- our position is that the relevant date has to be for the -- for the constitutional provision to have any meaning whatsoever, one of the three earlier dates, and at the very latest November 7th.

THE COURT: And do you have any authority for that, Mr. Jones?

MR. JONES: Well, off of -- right on the tip of my tongue, no. But I'll leave that to Professor Levinson in his briefing.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Jones, as you are there now, has Professor Levinson communicated to you that the plaintiffs have a good faith belief that it is a date prior to the date the electoral college meets?

And the reason I ask that, Mr. Jones, is --

MR. JONES: Sorry. I have not spoken directly to Professor Levinson about that subject. And I believe that Mr. McGarry has. And so the information I have about that legal argument comes through Mr. McGarry.

THE COURT: And --

MR. JONES: And that's -- but -- but -- if the question is do I have a good faith belief that we can -- do I have a belief that we can make a good faith argument that -- some day other than December 18th, the answer is yes.

THE COURT: The reason I ask is I'm reading the 12th Amendment before me. And if in fact I were to rule that the operative date is December 18, that might change what the discovery would be. It might be limited to a few interrogatories concerning what his intent is, if it hasn't been that already.

MR. JONES: Well, Your Honor, and -- my response

to that would be if the issue is his intent on December 18th, where he's going to be an inhabitant on December 18th, that would require more discovery, not less. And certainly that would put us in a position perhaps to even have a hearing, because the credibility of that intent would certainly be at issue if -- you know, if the court is going to prejudge that -- that particular issue.

MR. AUFHAUSER: Your Honor, this dialogue just underscores that this is a political controversy in search of a legal theory. I think you've just heard that the plaintiffs' counsel is -- would like to be able to say that the dispositive date is December 18th but doesn't know whether he can legally say so.

MR. BERENSON: Your Honor, Bill Berenson.

I've been holding back Mr. Jones. Unfortunately, he is just very new to this case. It is my understanding from reviewing case law, Black's Law Dictionary, statutory authority, both in Wyoming and Texas, really I think a key question for the court to decide is even if the court decides that December the 18th is in fact the dispositive date, my understanding, Your Honor, is to be an inhabitant is something that you cannot become overnight, or even in two or three weeks or even in a couple of months.

In fact, I believe, if I remember from memory, that Black's uses the usual and permanent definition. In other

words, residency in Wyoming is a minimum, just to be a resident, Your Honor, of one year. And many statutes in Wyoming, I've briefed this, sir, state that not only have you been living continuously in Wyoming for that one year but you have not also resided in another state, for example, Texas, during that year.

So without arguing the case, Your Honor, I think that even if the court decides that December 18th is in fact the date, I don't think that at the last second the 12th Amendment has in mind that Thomas Jefferson could have had a Virginia vice president and then the vice president could have moved up to Massachusetts overnight. I don't think that's what the founding fathers had in mind.

And I think that if the court allows us a reasonable amount of discovery, including -- we would like a deposition, but we certainly understand the efficiencies here. Certainly reasonable amounts of interrogatories and document productions, we think that we can show Your Honor -- again, I apologize for overarguing the case -- that a lot of this is simply too little too late to legally become a "inhabitant" as that term is used in the 12th Amendment.

THE COURT: Mr. Berenson, since you have some ability to address this more specifically than does Mr. Jones due to his late entry in the case, let me ask you.

In your emergency amended complaint you have several paragraphs -- and I'm referring now to paragraph 13 and its subparts, and apparently there are some other paragraphs, such as paragraphs 16, 17, and 18, and 19, that appear to be based on specific factual allegations that you believe are sufficient to entitle you to a preliminary injunction. And perhaps you could answer for me what discovery it is that you feel you need. MR. BERENSON: Okay. Your Honor, I'm not sure if I caught all those paragraphs, but I think I --THE COURT: Let me give you an example, Mr. Berenson. MR. BERENSON: Okay. THE COURT: You rely on the allegation that he has inhabited in Highland Park, that he filed homestead exemptions for several years, he paid certain real estate taxes and the like. Yes, sir. MR. BERENSON: THE COURT: You also talk about his driver's license, automobile registration, address in annual reports, physician treatments, and banking, and the like. MR. BERENSON: Oh, I see.

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is admissible?

need any additional discovery, provided that your evidence

THE COURT: So what I'm wondering is do you really

I mean, I agree with what Mr. Jones said a moment ago when he said the fact that something is in a newspaper doesn't make it admissible.

MR. BERENSON: Correct. We do I think unfortunately run into some severe hearsay problems in terms of building a record for these higher appellate courts. And I do think, Your Honor, that under the circumstances -- and certainly I mean no disrespect at all to the defendants. I hold them in high regard. I feel like, back to the purpose of the 12th Amendment, if you know the -- of course, Your Honor, you're a scholar and you understand what happened in the election of 1800 and the whole reason for needing the 12th Amendment in terms of the exact time between Jefferson and Burr.

I don't think that these founding fathers, as brilliant as Thomas Jefferson was, had in mind a last-minute shenanigans where someone could start discarding baggage just at the last minute. And if we could have sufficient discovery, we think we could show that is exactly what happened.

The Highland Park home, we have on authority, but perhaps not in admissible form, was only listed for sale last week. Only last I think November the 16th, Your Honor. It is listed as owner occupied, we have it on belief. Secretary Cheney is living there.

So if he states in his interrogatories simply, what, I intend to move to Wyoming, and then he's elected vice president, we know he's going to live in Washington, D.C. We know that he's going to immediately change his Wyoming driver's license to D.C., his voting to D.C. or Virginia. I don't want to use the word "sham," but I don't think that he can legally qualify as a resident. I think he is an inhabitant of Texas. You can't just change your spots.

MR. AUFHAUSER: I think we're getting off to the merits, but forgive me, Your Honor. I do want to respond to that. Whatever may have been true in 1800 in terms of lack of mobility and the rapidity with which each of us have changed addresses from schools and college to various marriages and jobs and where we practice law, differences between the year 1800 and 2000 is more than two centuries it's light years. And the functional definition of inhabitancy would have to be looked at in light of today. And more importantly, it has to be looked at in the light of what state is he an inhabitant of on December 18th when the electoral college meets. And on that question there is no discovery, because that is the future. It is not history. And discovery focuses on history.

THE COURT: This is Judge Fitzwater.

I'm wondering if in light of what the plaintiffs are requesting that the court could allow a limited number of

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     requests for admission, where the plaintiffs would set out
     these matters, such as requests that Secretary Cheney admit
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      or deny a certain fact, and see if we can't deal with it
      that way. And that's why, Mr. Berenson, I'm asking the type
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      discovery you think you need.
                MR. BERENSON: Yes, sir. I had prepared a list of
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      interrogatories. May I read --
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                THE COURT: How many are there, by the way?
                               Well, I had 25.
                MR. BERENSON:
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                THE COURT: Okay. Why don't you give me an
      illustration.
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                MR. BERENSON: Okay. For example, did he list his
      Texas home for sale on November 16th. I mean, that's -- you
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      know, we don't know that for a fact. We think that's
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      correct.
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           State the date that Mr. Cheney abandoned his Texas
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      home.
           I don't want to give away our entire trial strategy,
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      Your Honor, but I mean, I think the court -- you know, did
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      he claim his 2000 Texas homestead exemption.
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                THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
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                MR. BERENSON:
                               Yes, sir.
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                THE COURT:
                            Mr. Hartmann, I'll call upon you or
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      Mr. Aufhauser, since you represent Secretary Cheney.
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           Again, reiterating that I understand the motions to
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dismiss need to be addressed first, but hoping to get the whole thing wrapped up, is it possible that your client could respond to requests for admission, or no more than a certain number of interrogatories, and do it very quickly, really at the same time the briefing is going on with the motion to dismiss, so I can get this all wrapped up at once?

MR. HARTMANN: Your Honor, I may say we certainly can. We still are groping with the question, however, of how -- how on earth some of these questions can relate to what we believe is very clear under the law, and that is an inquiry that will have to be made on the 18th of December.

But clearly, if the court requires us to respond in a limited fashion, we would just request that it be very narrowly tailored. And certainly we would be willing to do that.

MR. AUFHAUSER: I do want to add, however, I'm not waiving the right to object to what's asked.

THE COURT: Well, you're not. And one way to handle that would be either to allow you to object when you get them or for the court to step in prospectively and just rule on what would be answered, so we could shorten that.

MR. AUFHAUSER: I tell you what. This is Robin's suggestion, as we caucus a little bit here at the table. I wonder if the court today will refrain from ordering

discovery with the following representation by me and Haynes & Boone -- This is David Aufhauser again speaking -- that we attempt during the next 24 hours to agree on a stipulation of facts with plaintiffs' counsel. If we fail to, we advise the court by tomorrow at 5:00 p.m., or 9:00 a.m. Wednesday morning, and the court can do what it sees fit.

But I would respectfully ask the court not to order discovery pending the motion to dismiss.

MR. BERENSON: Your Honor, Bill Berenson.

May I quickly respond to that?

THE COURT: You may.

MR. BERENSON: With all due respect, I believe that to be an idea, but having read the briefs that were filed by defendants, I'm not so sure where that's going to lead. Having been on this case myself only for, you know, a week or two, I'm not going to -- I really feel like there is a need for the plaintiffs to have discovery, Your Honor, and I really appreciate what the court is doing here.

I think that we have to have it, Your Honor. There will be no record. I don't think the defendants are going to stipulate to the kinds of things that they -- that the plaintiff is going to be asking.

MS. MIERS: Your Honor, may I speak?
This is Harriet Miers.

On behalf of my client, we are in a time crunch here

for one reason and one reason only, and that is that this matter, although discussed in the media for a very long time, is just now being brought before the court. And we would respectfully request that the court bifurcate the motions from hearing the preliminary injunction, given what is clearly going to be subject to serious debate in terms of scope of discovery. And I know on behalf of my client, and it has already been said on behalf of Secretary Cheney, we will respond to anything else that the court feels needs to be responded to on a quick basis.

But if the motions could be ruled upon by Friday of this week and then we proceed the beginning of next week, if there is any basis for doing so, I respectfully suggest that that is a mechanism for an orderly disposition without what is clearly going to be contentious.

THE COURT: Mr. Jones.

MR. JONES: Your Honor, obviously I disagree with that wholeheartedly. The only thing it is a mechanism for is delay.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Jones, let me start with the motion to dismiss and then I'll go back to the application.

Could you-all get in your response to the motion to dismiss by 4:30 on Wednesday?

MR. JONES: Yes.

THE COURT: And by get it in, I mean you would

file it -- and I will allow for this purpose filing by fax, to give more time to finish -- and serving on the opponent by fax by 4:30 Wednesday the 29th.

MR. JONES: Okay.

THE COURT: And as of this point, I'm not inclined to allow the defendants to file reply briefs in support of their motions to dismiss, so that I can shorten the time.

Now, let me go back for a moment to the business of the applications.

One way that I could proceed with the applications on what I call merits, meaning the preliminary injunction, would be to require that the plaintiffs have their brief and their appendix that has their materials on it on file at Wednesday the 29th, at the same time they submit their response to the motion to dismiss, and then allow the defendants to file their own response by 4:30 on Thursday, the 30th, with their brief and any appendix materials they want, with the idea being to get a ruling out on the motions to dismiss, and/or if necessary the merits, by Friday, the 1st, which then allows a period of 17 calendar days, and fewer business days, to litigate in the circuit court and the Supreme Court.

In order to do that, and I'm going really back to the plaintiffs' desire expressed repeatedly for a quick ruling, it would be necessary that the plaintiffs get their brief

and appendix on the merits on file.

In that connection, I'm willing during this conference to hear Mr. Berenson's interrogatories and hear any objections and rule on what would be a permissible interrogatory, with the idea being that we would submit some time tomorrow for those interrogatory responses to be transmitted to Mr. Jones and Mr. Berenson.

Now, I'm not sure to whom I should turn first.

MR. JONES: Well, Your Honor, I would ask -- you know, now that I'm coming into this case, in the sense I've not even had the chance to look at those interrogatories, and I would certainly want to have input into those. So I would ask that we not proceed in that manner.

And I think, again, I'd make the request that we be given the opportunity to have some combination -- I think the court's idea of request for admissions was good -- but some combination of requests for admissions, interrogatories, and some documentary evidence as well.

THE COURT: Mr. Berenson, I know --

MR. JONES: I'm willing to serve those, you know, first thing -- you know, work through the night and have those ready first thing in the morning. But I would certainly ask that I and Mr. Levinson have some input into those.

THE COURT: Let me go back, if I might, to Mr.

Hartmann or Mr. Aufhauser.

Do you know what your ability would be to respond to request for admission or interrogatories by the end of tomorrow?

In other words, what -- if I allow fax -- if I allow you to fax your responses to plaintiffs' counsel, and if I allow the faxing to be a substitute for actual signatures and the like, do you even know the availability of your client to respond that quickly?

MR. AUFHAUSER: This is Mr. Aufhauser.

The short answer is no, I don't. I can certainly find out and promptly tell the court. But, you know, it depends on whether GSA gives him the case of a transition office or not.

MR. HARTMANN: Your Honor, if I could interject.

This is Rob Hartmann again. We got away from an earlier submission that we accept a stipulation. Plaintiffs' counsel was not enamored with that notion, but I don't know why we could not pursue that. If they could draft up what, you know, they believe the facts will show, instead of sending interrogatories, I don't know why we couldn't take a look at that.

You know, from what they have listed in the complaint there may be most of it that we can deal with in a stipulation and save all of us --

1 MR. AUFHAUSER: We would proffer stipulated facts 2 as well. Your Honor, Bill Berenson again. 3 MR. BERENSON: Ι appreciate the effort. I respectfully disagree. having read the motions, the briefs, frankly, I was shocked 5 by some of the things I read that the defendants are 6 7 alleging and arguing. And I think that may waste critical time. 8 Well, let me ask either Mr. Berenson THE COURT: 10 or Mr. Jones, are you willing to defer your briefing on the 11 merits until after the court rules on the motions to dismiss? 12 1.3 I'm really trying to get this whole thing wrapped up so that you have everything before the appellate court. 14 15 MR. JONES: I understand that. I appreciate that, 16 Your Honor. No, we're not willing to defer that, because I think that is simply a mechanism for delay and that -- like 1.7 I said, we can have our requests for admissions, 18 interrogatories and document requests ready to fax to them 1.9 first thing in the morning. 20 21 MR. AUFHAUSER: I'm sorry, are you through? 22 THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Aufhauser. 23 MR. AUFHAUSER: I must say I keep hearing the mantra this is a mechanism for delay. It is not. 24 the orthodoxy we are petitioning the court to follow. 25

have good faith, strong arguments that they have no earthly right to take discovery in your court. I say that respectfully.

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I appreciate the very creative suggestion you're making to try to wrap it up in one bundle so it can be before -both matters, merits or otherwise, could be before the court promptly. We are not the reason for delay. It's something Ms. Miers said to the court, and I want to underscore. Ιf there is any reason for delay it is that of the petitioner's. Frankly, to me, if I have to go back to Secretary Cheney and say even though they don't have the right to take discovery from you, even though you have an extraordinarily strong argument, you are required to answer these questions under oath -- and the last thing is -- I find it curious that the plaintiffs did not accept the court's invitation to rehearse the interrogatories over the phone right now, if that's the case. He would respectfully like to consult with his colleagues. Again, the delay is his making, not ours.

MR. TAYLOR: Andy Taylor. Your Honor, if I may make a comment for the 8 electors that I represent.

THE COURT: Please go ahead.

MR. TAYLOR: Certainly it would not be characterized as delay, and certainly it would be in the plaintiffs' best interest to get all of the parties against

whom he seeks injunctive relief truly in front of the court, so that whatever remedy this court fashions can be a remedy that would apply to all 32 electors.

2.0

And I would certainly represent to Your Honor on the record now that I will do my utmost to contact and be retained by the remaining 24 electors so that in the 24-hour period while the parties are trying to reach a stipulation I can get all of the other electors before the court.

And I think that would be in all of the parties' best interests, no matter how the court rules.

MR. JONES: Your Honor, if I may -- this is James Jones again.

As long as the electors are before the court by the time the court issues its injunction, if any, that -- that is sufficient. And I don't think that delaying discovery, which seems to be the universal theme I'm hearing from the other side, would do anything except delay discovery. It certainly should not delay a discovery from Mr. Cheney who is now before this court.

MS. MIERS: Your Honor, if I might, these -- I don't think it is beyond everyone's experience on this phone call that there are lots of people who would like to take depositions of my client. I've been down that road before. Secretary Cheney, any other number of high-level, prominent, media-watched people.

And the idea that someone can file a piece of paper in court, and even though jurisdiction is lacking, that discovery would be allowed, is a very significant policy issue. And that's what's occurring here. Because these motions that have been filed on behalf of our clients are solid and good, and they ought to be granted.

1.3

And for the plaintiffs, on the basis of a pleading that they file, the court gives them every right to file a response on their injunction and they haven't even yet done that as we speak today. They change -- or add counsel, and that's suddenly a reason for delay. And yet the disadvantage is visited on us, because expedited discovery is ordered, is pending the ruling on the motion.

And on behalf of my client I would request disposition of the motions that we believe are dispositive before discovery proceeds in this matter.

MR. TAYLOR: Andy Taylor for the state electors.

We certainly endorse that view. We, in our pleadings or papers filed today with the court, state that this lawsuit is an attempt to run government by injunction. Because what they're trying to do is to get an order from Your Honor that would prohibit the State of Texas from casting its 32 electoral votes and exclude it from participating in the election of the president and vice president of the United States, and yet they don't even want all of the electors to

be before Your Honor before they try to accomplish and fashion such a claim for relief.

If you look at the amended complaint, there is no mention of service information. It lists the 32 electors by name and then the cities that they're from, but with no address information. And also, counsel, correct me, to the best of my knowledge no attempt on their part has been made to issue service of process on any of them.

And so it seems to me odd that at base level this would be a request for injunctive relief against parties who are not before the court. And certainly there should be an opportunity to get everybody in front of the court. That would not in any way, while I'm attempting to round everybody up, put a hurdle in front of Your Honor to grant the motions to dismiss. Because the court is fully empowered to grant those motions to dismiss, despite the fact that not all parties are present.

But we would need everyone present before the court could grant any requests for discovery or expedited matters, because it affects the necessary parties that would have to be part of this litigation.

THE COURT: This is the court. Let me go back to Mr. Aufhauser or Mr. Hartmann.

The court is sensitive to the issue of discovery in a case such as this. I'm wondering if in considering the

practical aspects of this case you prefer getting whatever discovery is allowed over with tomorrow or the next day, versus the possibility that I grant the motion to dismiss, it's reversed, and then we're looking at something on the merits even closer to December 18. And that's part of what the court's examining.

MR. HARTMANN: Your Honor, Rob Hartmann. Let me just say a couple of things briefly.

It would be our preference that we go forward with no discovery.

I truly believe that the parties before you that raise the legal issues that are now extant, don't require discovery for -- you know, for treatment. And by going forward with any kind of discovery and attempting to put this whole thing in a package, you're really only capturing -- I'm not sure we're capturing anything additional that would be helpful to the appellate court.

I mean, to me it makes more sense to address these substantive issues that are currently before you.

Now, having said that, I -- I've got a little bit of an alarm that's gone off in my mind in listening to this colloquy. And that is because I've looked at some of these particulars that the plaintiffs have in their papers, I listened to you ask the plaintiffs for some illustrations on interrogatories that they would propose.

I think they listed three. I thought all of those probably were properly the subject of some kind of a stipulation. And frankly, you know, it's something we do all the time. I did not see why we couldn't dispose of the issues that way. The plaintiffs are resistant to that. I'm becoming a little concerned that they have in mind more wide-ranging discovery than I am thinking about right now, or discovery of a different kind. I don't know why they would resist this, because it seems to me an easier course to work with us to stipulate as to these facts.

MR. AUFHAUSER: This is David Aufhauser. I again endorse what my co-counsel has just said.

The short answer to your question is the latter not the former. That is, the question of whether or not this court has power to hear this question and whether or not these plaintiffs have a right to prosecute the action is the question that should be decided immediately and the question that should be presented to the Fifth Circuit.

And if -- I'm confident we never have to reach the question of discovery of these factual issues because it's not before the court properly. They do not -- our assertion is simple. They are not the proper parties to bring this action and this is not the right place to bring the complaint. And because of that, respectfully, the court doesn't have the power to order discovery.

THE COURT: All right. Does anyone else want to be heard?

MR. JONES: Your Honor, I -- James Jones.

I would just note that in every injunctive case that comes before you in which expedited discovery is ordered, that discovery is ordered and takes place prior to, you know, rulings on motions to dismiss such as this that are filed.

I understand they think a lot of their motions. We don't think as much of them. We think this court does have power to hear this case. We think this is the proper place to bring this case. And I don't believe that the court should be joining in this effort -- not -- what is an obvious effort simply to delay this case so that they basically -- the defendants can win this case by delay. All they have to do is delay a ruling on the merits beyond December 18th and they have won this case not on the merits but simply by delay.

And -- and I think that if the court is not going to allow us to take the depositions, to allow us, you know, requests for admissions, interrogatories, document requests, like I said, we can have those to you first thing in the morning, and -- I don't know what it is Mr. Hartmann is worried about, in terms of far-ranging discovery. The discovery will be tailored to the issue of where Mr. Cheney

is an inhabitant, which is the issue that is before this court.

Get this thing wrapped up.

MS. MIERS: Your Honor, Harriet Miers.

May I respond?

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THE COURT: You may.

MS. MIERS: With all due respect to counsel, I believe he misstates the law.

With respect to motions to dismiss of the sort that have been filed in this matter, that question standing of plaintiff and subject matter jurisdiction, discovery is not only not routinely allowed, it's not allowed at all, because, as earlier referenced, the whole issue of whether there is a court that can hear disputes about that discovery is at question until those motions are ruled upon.

With respect to the preliminary injunction request, even that is discretionary, as I think all counsel on this phone call know.

If in fact discovery were to be issued in this case in the ordinary course, and in order to protect my client, I assume counsel's ability to protect their client, I would want the opportunity to respond to that discovery request, just like in any matter, so that if discovery is requested prematurely, as it is being requested here, I could object to it. If it is discovery not of the sort that ought to be

had, I could object to it.

It is for all these reasons that we respectfully request that the motions that are before the court that are dispositive be ruled upon before discovery proceeds, and depending on the resolution of those motions that we do next whatever needs to be done.

And all counsel are saying, at least on this side of the table, we're going to act promptly to respond to the court's handling of the matter every step of the way. And we're doing that I think under extraordinary circumstances, where the delay and urgency is created by the plaintiff.

THE COURT: All right. This is Judge Fitzwater speaking.

This is the ruling of the court concerning our procedure.

First, I'm not going to consolidate the preliminary injunction application with trial on the merits. There is no time to do that, and that procedure contemplates that the parties can be fully prepared for trial, albeit on an expedited basis, and we don't have the time between now and December 18 to do that.

Second, while recognizing that the motions to dismiss are to be decided prior to reaching the merits, I believe it's in the best interest of the parties and the country to have this case resolved promptly in this court. And so I'm

going to allow some limited discovery will and brief -- and requiring briefing on the merits on a dual track with the briefing on the motions to dismiss.

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By 9:00 o'clock a.m. Dallas time, on November 28, by that time, the plaintiff -- plaintiffs must have faxed or otherwise provided to counsel for Secretary Cheney a combination of 25 of the following: Interrogatories; requests for admission; or stipulations of fact.

Discovery may only be sought from Secretary Cheney, not from Governor Bush or the elector defendants.

Those 25 discovery requests can all be interrogatories or they can all be requests for admissions or they can all be proposed stipulations, but the combination must not exceed 25. And interrogatories are limited to the actual interrogatory, with no subparts.

If Secretary Cheney's counsel and plaintiffs' counsel cannot work out any objections, I will be available at 11:00 o'clock tomorrow for a conference call to rule on any objections.

Now, in a moment I'm going to hear from counsel before I set the deadline finally for responding to whatever discovery I allow. But the presumptive deadline in my mind, so that the rest of what I'm about to say makes sense, would be that Secretary Cheney's responses are faxed to plaintiffs' counsel, to whatever discovery I allow, by 9:00

o'clock Dallas time, November 29.

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Then at 4:30, November 29, the plaintiffs would be required to file their brief in opposition to the motions to dismiss, their brief in support of their preliminary injunction application, and their appendix of evidence.

By "file" I mean it is permissible to fax it to the court and to fax opposing counsels' copies to them.

And then the defendants would have until 4:30 on November 30, to file, and by that I mean fax to the court, their brief on opposition to the merits and any appendix that they wish to file.

And no reply brief in support of the motion to dismiss would be permitted. And no reply brief in support of the preliminary injunction application would be permitted. And the court would decide the motions to dismiss and if applicable reach the merits by sometime in the afternoon of December 1st.

Now let me turn if I might to Mr. Hartmann.

Understanding you're not waiving any objection to anything, what's your position on whether if I make a ruling by 11:00 o'clock tomorrow on any disputed discovery you could have your responses faxed by the next morning at 9:00 o'clock?

MR. HARTMANN: Your Honor, I really should defer to Mr. Aufhauser on that.

My reaction is 9:00 to 11:00 would be a little bit short. I would suggest at least until after lunch.

You think, David?

MR. AUFHAUSER: Yes. Your Honor, I simply don't know what Secretary Cheney is doing tomorrow between 9:00 and 11:00 o'clock Dallas time. He may be in flight. He may be engaged in affairs of state. I just don't know.

So I respectfully ask that we push back that objection period some period of time, some number of hours tomorrow.

THE COURT: I'm not sure what your schedule is tomorrow. I am required to be in New Orleans on Wednesday for judicial business and am going to be flying there myself tomorrow afternoon. I will be reachable at some point, but not in flight.

My hope as well was that by having a shorter period that would give you more time to prepare your responses.

I would be willing to do the following, to have counsel advise me at 11:00 a.m. of any need for additional time, including the need to contact Secretary Cheney and any proposal for when they would want to have the conference. Obviously, the delay in that ruling affects the defendants more than it affects the plaintiffs, so if the defendants are making that request I don't necessarily have a problem with it.

MR. HARTMANN: That's a good solution. We'll

7 advise you of 11:00 whether or not I can keep to the 2. schedule of 11:00. All right. Now, without requesting THE COURT: motions for rehearing at this point, do counsel have 5 questions of the court concerning my ruling? Mr. Jones? 6 7 MR. JONES: None from the plaintiffs, Your Honor. THE COURT: Ms. Miers? 8 MS. MIERS: Not at this time. 9 Mr. Aufhauser or Mr. Hartmann? THE COURT: 10 11 MR. AUFHAUSER: If I understand the way you framed 12 it, not at this time. But we do respectfully observe the right to object to the order before discovery. 13 THE COURT: That's fine. I understand that. 14 MR. HARTMANN: Your Honor, when we speak tomorrow 15 16 at 11:00, we may need to address the rest of the schedule 17 depending on the secretary's availability and our ability to 18 get the information requested. MS. MIERS: If I'm understanding the court's 19 20 ruling, in spite of the fact that none of us have our clients present, we are reserving -- we are not waiving our 21 right to object to the rulings of the court? 22 23 THE COURT: Well, you're not. But, Ms. Miers, as 24 far as I see your client, whom I understand is Governor 25 Bush, there really is nothing different from what you

originally requested. No discovery is allowed of him personally, and all I've really done is taken away from you your right to file a reply in support of your motion to dismiss. I'm not sure what you would be objecting to, really.

1.

MS. MIERS: Well, Your Honor, we're required to participate in discovery, and it affects my client's rights and it's just a matter that I have to reserve the right to talk to my client about and make a determination thereafter.

As I indicated previously, having to participate in discovery on the record in this case creates the significant policy concern for us. And I'm not saying that we will take any action, but I have to reserve the right to discuss that issue with my client.

THE COURT: That's fair enough.

I really meant by my question, I really was asking, and not rhetorically arguing, whether or not there was any prejudice. But I understand everyone reserves the right to object.

MR. TAYLOR: Two questions. The phone counsel at 11:00 o'clock are all counsel of record supposed to be part of that call?

THE COURT: You are welcome. I really had in mind plaintiffs' counsel and Secretary Cheney's counsel. These requests would only be directed to him. But I don't intend

to deprive anyone of the right to participate. 1. MR. TAYLOR: I wanted to make sure I understood 2. the court's intention. And then secondly, is this order 3 something that is going to be transcribed and circulated? THE COURT: 5 The order that I issue will be in 6 writing. I will not circulate it as agreement to form. I believe everything we've been doing has been posted on our 7 web site. And you might even get a copy more guickly there 8 than you would from me. However, I'm glad to have a member of my staff fax you a copy of the order. 10 11 MR. TAYLOR: I'm talking about the order preceding you've just outlined. 12 13 THE COURT: That's what I'm referring to. 14 MR. TAYLOR: Those are my only two questions. 15 MS. MIERS: Just for the record. Harriet Miers. 16 I would like to participate in any conference that's 17 held in the matter. 18 THE COURT: All right. That's fine. 19 Whoever is the initiating attorney at 11:00 o'clock, 20 and I would assume it would be the objecting attorney, if you'll make certain that Ms. Miers is able to be on the 21 22 phone. 23 I would request the same, for Andy MR. TAYLOR: Taylor. 24 25 THE COURT: All right. That's fine.

MR. BERENSON: Your Honor, Bill Berenson.

First, I want to thank you for your -- your cooperation, the wonderful way the court has expedited the discovery. I genuinely appreciate that. I'm sure all counsel do.

But since nobody seems to be -- of course, given the craziness of the last week, and Secretary Cheney's schedule and his unfortunate health problems, I don't mean to be negative, but I would like to think quickly in terms of a back-up of what if tomorrow at 11:00 he is not available for -- you know, you're going out of town Wednesday. Do I understand that you're going to be in New Orleans? I'm curious. This could delay us into Thursday, Friday.

Is there an alternative back-up plan we could quickly envision?

THE COURT: This is the court. It would be my intention to change the schedule just ever so slightly so that this could be accomplished quickly.

Again, and somewhat addressing the issues that have been raised about the importance and the other public policy issues, it's the court's impression that it benefits all parties for this to be resolved quickly. And so my intent, Mr. Berenson, would be if this can't be done, to do it quickly still.

MR. BERENSON: Yes, sir.

MR. AUFHAUSER: This is David Aufhauser. you for letting me participate. And if it's doable, I would request of the court reporter for an expedited copy of the transcript of this hearing. THE COURT: You may. And do you want her just to state on the telephone her phone number or allow to contact her? All right. There being nothing further, that's the conclusion of the conference. Thank you.

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2	<u>C E R T I F I C A T I O N</u>
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4	I, PAMELA J. WILSON, CSR, certify that the foregoing is
5	a transcript from the record of the proceedings in the
6	foregoing entitled matter.
7	
8	I further certify that the transcript fees format comply
9	with those prescribed by the Court and the Judicial
10	Conference of the United States.
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12	This the 27th day of November, 2000.
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21	PAMELA J. WILSON, CSR
22	Official Court'Reporter The Northern District of Texas
23	Dallas Division
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